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Abstract 
In the study of Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures (BICA), relatively little attention has 
been paid to the evolutionary development of cognitive capabilities. There are two successful 
evolutionary strategies, i.e. resilient and cheap to reproduce individuals vs. more capable individuals 
that are necessarily expensive to reproduce. The vertebrate family is the prime example of the “evolve 
more capable individual” strategy. A sequence of increasingly complex and cognitively capable 
individuals has resulted from the vertebrate strategy.  At the heart of the vertebrate strategy is a set of 
midbrain structures common to all vertebrates. The role of the core structures seems to be preparing 
the body for different classes of sensory-guided behaviors, while interactions among the core 
structures insure appropriate switching between behavior classes.  More complex vertebrate brains 
evolved by adding new structures with feedback loops that link the new structure to the core structures 
and to sensory and motor processing components. A general rule for a new vertebrate structure is that 
it has to leave the core structures along the central midline of the brain intact, and that it cannot 
degrade functionality found in brains without the new structure.  The evolution of two new capabilities 
critical to cognitive performance is discussed: the evolution from non-specific anticipation to specific 
prediction, and the evolution of simple combinations of landmarks into detailed models of familiar 
places. 
 
Keywords: Evolution, core midline structures, emotion, prediction, familiar spaces 
1 Introduction 
Within the vertebrate family, a sequence of increasingly complex species has evolved.  Complexity 
is a useful trait from an evolutionary point of view, if the species with greater complexity is able to 
survive longer in a larger set of environments than simpler animals, and uses that advantage to 
produce enough offspring to maintain or expand its population in spite of disease, new competitors or 
predators, and changing climate.  Note that, greater complexity could easily have a negative impact on 
the long-term survival of a species, since structural complexity requires a greater investment of 
resources in single individuals, and behavioral complexity creates a possibility for interference with 
old behaviors that helped their simpler predecessors survive. However, the number of vertebrates alive 
Procedia Computer Science
Volume 41, 2014, Pages 233–242
BICA 2014. 5th Annual International Conference on Biologically
Inspired Cognitive Architectures
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Scientiﬁc Programme Committee of BICA 2014
c© The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
233
doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2014.11.108 
  
in the world argues for the evolutionary success of the vertebrate strategy.  The alternate evolutionary 
strategy, that has also enjoyed great success, does not involve increasing the complexity of 
individuals.  This strategy is exemplified by bacteria and simple invertebrates, and involves making 
individuals that are tough and cheap to reproduce.  
The aspect of the vertebrate strategy that is of most interest to the Biologically Inspired Cognitive 
Architectures (BICA) community is the increasing brain size and greater intelligence of more recent 
members of the family. While there are many capabilities associated with increased brain size, we 
claim that there are three that provide evolutionary advantages: 
• Predicting when and where unsensed dangers and rewards will appear, and how ones 
choice of actions will interact with the danger or reward.   
• Appraisal of the predicted outcomes of possible actions, and the comparison of predicted 
and actual world situations. 
• Manipulating the environment in new ways to decrease danger, increase rewards, and 
support a larger population than the environment could support before it was 
manipulated.  Thus the ability to predict and appraise the effects of actions is a 
prerequisite to learning to manipulate the environment. 
In other words, these three new capabilities provide the advantages that paid the “cost” for 
increasing complexity during vertebrate evolution. Other cognitive capabilities including learning, 
recognition of specific objects and places, and reasoning evolved because they augment these three 
capabilities.  If this claim is correct, then the characteristics of the “supportive” capabilities are 
constrained by their need to support the three capabilities with direct evolutionary benefits. 
In the rest of this paper, the vertebrate strategy for evolving complex brains will be discussed from 
a structural and then a functional point of view.  Then, we will focus on the evolution of predictive 
capability from a diffuse sense of danger, to anticipation, to specific predictions of the impact of one’s 
own actions on future situations.  Prediction is a prerequisite for appraisal and tool use, and thus the 
critical first step in evolving complex vertebrate brains.  The evolution of improved internal models of 
the world will also be considered, since it is closely tied to the evolution of predictive capability. 
Constructing these internal representations requires learning techniques beyond basic stimulus-
response learning. 
2 Structural Aspect of the Vertebrate Strategy 
Vertebrate organization concentrates computation in the brain and organizes long-range 
communication in the spinal cord providing efficiency and rapid communication from any sense to 
any muscle group. It is the most efficient method for organizing neural structure currently available. A 
comparison early vertebrate brains to more evolved ones shows that all of the brains have a common 
core.  A set of structures in the center midline region is found in all vertebrate brains, including the 
brains of proto-fish (e.g. Lamprey).  More complex and capable vertebrates differ from simple ones by 
having additional “pieces” that link into the common core.  In moving up from proto-fish, through fish 
and amphibians, to reptiles, birds, and mammals it is the addition of a major new piece that is retained 
by subsequently evolving creatures that really defines the group.  Each new piece creates massive 
feedback links between common core components and other preexisting pieces. The main rules for 
adding puzzle pieces to vertebrate brains are that the core set of structures found in the central midline 
portion is maintained largely intact, and that the addition of the new piece should not degrade 
functionality found in the earlier brain.   
Fish have a brain that forms a pipeline from sensory input through the common core and into the 
motor output with relatively little feedback.  One notable exception is the cerebellum that sits over the 
hindbrain and provides feedback between the motor, sensing, and common core regions of the brain. It 
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seems to be the first piece added in the vertebrate strategy for building more capable individuals.  This 
new piece makes possible a greater smoothness and variability of movement than in animals that lack 
a cerebellum.  It seems clear that superior movement would provide an evolutionary advantage as long 
as movements needed for survival were retained or upgraded. 
Reptilian brains added at least two major pieces to vertebrate brains, i.e. the reptilian brain that 
includes a true hippocampus, and the dorsal ventral ridge (which is a precursor of a visual cortex 
found in birds and mammals).  These pieces are not found in amphibians or any animal that evolved 
earlier.   The ventral ridge makes it possible to visually discriminate a much larger number of objects, 
while the hippocampus allows the construction of far more detailed internal models of the world.   An 
evolutionary advantage would be provided by the ability to detect food, friend, or foe at greater 
distance.  However, better internal world models than those required to do primitive landmark 
navigation doesn’t seem to provide a clear evolutionary advantage; let alone one that would support 
the massive increase in brain size represented by the reptilian brain.  We propose that the capability 
that provided the evolutionary advantage that fueled the emergence of the reptilian brain is place-
specific anticipation. 
In mammals, particularly primates, the new brain piece added is a greatly expanded cerebral 
cortex.   The evolutionary advantage this provides for primates is allowing them to make specific 
predictions and to manipulate the environment. 
3 Role of the Core Structures in Vertebrate Brains 
The slow responding neurons in the core structures have a very diffuse distribution of axon 
termination (Eilbert 1980), and so are not a suitable substrate for quick stimulus-response reactions or 
for internally modeling physical structure or event timing.  For this reason, the core vertebrate 
structures rarely get a mention from people interested in BICA or cognitive modeling, who have 
focused on perceptual or motor brain regions or on psychological results.  However, the core 
vertebrate structures are critical to cognitive performance, since localized damage to the core 
structures generally leaves the victim in a vegetative state (Damasio 2010). 
Some answers to the questions about what the core structures actually do have recently begun to 
emerge from work that is only peripherally related to questions about cognitive architectures.  Jaak 
Panksepp and Lucy Biven (2012), in their book The Archeology of the Mind, said that the core 
midline brain structures can be divided into seven primitive emotion subsystems.  The research lines 
that inform their approach come from brain stimulation and self-stimulation work, as well as work on 
neurotransmitters and brain connectivity.  Evidence within the book was organized to support their 
primary claim, i.e. animals have real emotions and strong human emotions draw far more on the 
midbrain than the cortex.  The primary utility they see for their work is in psychiatry.  
Stimulation of a distinct primitive emotion system in the vertebrate core has either a positive or 
negative effect, as well as visible physiological changes.  In other words, in mammals (which is where 
Panksepp and Blivens collected their evidence) stimulation of a region in the core generated an 
emotional response that researchers were able to recognize.  Panksepp and Blivens found core regions 
associated with the following primitive emotions: 
• Seeking 
• Rage 
• Fear 
• Lust 
• Care 
• Panic/Grief 
• Play  
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Fish don’t display Care or Play; although schooling fish show what looks like panic when 
separated from the school. 
Antonio Damasio (2010) also believes the core structures are critical for cognition and emotion.  
The evidence he uses in his book, “The Self Comes to Mind,” overlaps extensively with the evidence 
used by Panksepp and Blivens.  However, he relies on human introspection and brain injury studies 
more than brain stimulation work.  He organizes the evidence in his book to show how a sense of Self 
could emerge from the brain architectures of higher mammals.  He argues that the self has several 
levels.  It turns out that the structural core of brain nuclei that support primitive emotions, as described 
by Panksepp and Blivens, agrees closely with structures that Damasio claims support the core level for 
the self.  We note that Damasio’s core includes more perceptual and motor structures than are included 
in the core defined by Panksepp and Blivens. 
In order to address the issue of role that the core structures would play in a BICA, we look at why 
the core structures were needed in the first place.  Even before the evolution of vertebrates, animals 
had to make important physiological adjustments as they switched between different classes of 
behaviors.  In hiding, all movement including respiration had to be minimized, senses had to be fully 
attended in order to increase chances of detecting a threat, and indications of available food had to be 
ignored.  In fleeing, muscles responsible for movement had to be allowed to use all available energy, 
senses not needed in picking a route had to be tuned out, and all but the most severe sensations of pain 
had to be tuned out.  In reproductive behavior, sensitivity to the right pheromones had to be very high, 
other senses needed to be tuned out, and reproductive motor activity needed to control many of the 
body’s muscles.  From an evolutionary point of view, the ability to switch behaviors at the appropriate 
time is clearly a critical capability for long-term autonomous behavior. On the other hand, it is hard to 
explain the survival advantage of emotions.  Thus, we argue that the primary role of the core structures 
is to prepare the brain and body for behavioral switches, and that strong visible emotions are a natural 
side-effect of core structure activity. 
Support for this claim is found in citations from both Panksepp & Blivens (2012) and Damasio 
(2010) when they describe the core structures as “emotional action systems.”  According to Damasio 
(2010), “The universality of emotional expressions reveals the degree to which the emotional action 
program is unlearned and automated. At each performance, the emotion can be modulated, for 
example, with small changes of intensity or duration of component movements. The basic program 
routine, however, is stereotypical, at all the body levels at which it is executed—external motions; 
visceral changes in the heart, lungs, gut, and skin; and endocrine changes. The execution of the same 
emotion can vary from occasion to occasion but not enough to make it unrecognizable to the subject or 
to others.”   Put another way, characteristic signs of activating the rage emotional action system can be 
seen before an attack.  Similarly, signs of fear are visible before fleeing.  
Panksepp and Blivens (2012) point out  “The evidence indicates that the emotional action systems 
generate feelings that can be triggered completely inside the brain, although each has certain sensory 
trigger spots (for instance, pain arouses FEAR).” So, stimulation of a core structure in the midbrain 
does not elicit a specific motor sequence the way stimulation of a region in the motor cortex can do, 
but generates emotional response and makes it likely a particular class of behavior will occur.  This 
suggests that behavioral switching is closely followed by a visible emotional response (Eilbert 2009), 
which is consistent with interpreting emotions as physiological manifestations that accompany 
behavior switching.  
For the vertebrate strategy to work, there must be a number of additional neural systems working 
with a set of core structures that support a situation-appropriate behavior switching strategy. These 
include sensory processing systems, motor activation systems, a toolkit of sensory-guided skills: 
landmark navigation (moving toward, away, between, tracking), object capture, and collision 
avoidance.  Note that all of these visual skills are carried out quite well by fish with an Optic Tectum 
(which corresponds to the Superior Colliculus in more advance vertebrates) and no cerebral cortex.  
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At each evolutionary level, new behavior classes appear and old behaviors are enhanced as new 
“pieces” are added to the brain.  
• Fish level -- the basic sensory-guided skills are integrated into a set of survival-oriented 
behaviors: foraging, fleeing, attack, tracking, forming schools.   
• Reptilian level -- search for a particular object, mapping new regions or objects (i.e. 
exploration), object uncertainty resolution, anticipation, and composing lower-level skills 
or behaviors into higher-level conditional behaviors. 
• Bird/mammal level -- caring for young, group play, team strategy, narrative level 
prediction, and tool use. 
• Human level -- counterfactual imagination, blending of objects or narratives, and time 
compression. 
In summary, the core structures provide coordination between Emotional Action systems vying for 
control of sensory and motor resources.  These structures are critical in ensuring long-term autonomy 
in challenging environments.  The vertebrate strategy of adding new structures with massive feedback 
into the core and other existing structures results in new behaviors and enhancements to old ones.  
This strategy poses several BICA related questions.  What vertebrate level would one need to model in 
order to have a BICA?  Can new behaviors be bootstrapped onto the behaviors currently available by 
adding new brain structures with massive feed back?   
 
In the next section, the focus will be on the evolution of predictive behaviors and the changes in 
internal world modeling and learning that were required to support better predicative capability. 
4 Predictive Capability and the Evolution of the SEEKING 
Emotional Action System  
Panksepp and Bliven’s description of the SEEKING system suggest that this system is closely tied 
to basic anticipation and simple prediction.  They say that the SEEKING “generates energetic 
exploration and foraging, along with affects that can be better described as euphoric excitement rather 
than reward or pleasure— the feeling is one of anticipatory-expectant eagerness and, at a more 
cognitive level, the engendering of discrete expectancies.  It prompts people and animals to search for 
the resources that they need.”  Fish lack reasoning and complex world models, but they have the same  
SEEKING systems brain nuclei as are found in more advanced vertebrates.  So fish have a pre-
predictive SEEKING system that carries out tasks that expanded into a predictive system as brain 
regions were added to the core midbrain structures over the course of evolution. The role of the Fish 
Seeking system is to make a fish want to continue what it is doing even if there is a distraction that 
could trigger a different behavior.  Thus, the Seeking System must mediate among the other Emotional 
Action Systems which must all compete for the same sensory and motor resources. For fish, Seeking 
is essentially a hysteresis mechanism that prevents behaviors that have been triggered by sensations to 
from terminating too easily.   
More sophisticated anticipation requires a sophisticated internal world model.  The vertebrate 
solution to an internal model that is useful for prediction first appeared in reptiles.  Rather than a 
single location such as a nest, they would remember stuff about a much larger area delineated by a set 
of landmarks.  The kind of activity that goes on in the space would be stored along with the objects 
generally found in the place, and how those object contribute to the activity going on in the space.  
This type of Familiar Space Memory allows a reptile to anticipate what was behind a large object 
without sensing it, or to predict that an unsensed animal was close by because it sensed a different 
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animal that was often collocated with the animal of interest.  Thus, a reptile can anticipate danger 
without knowing specifically what is dangerous. 
In higher vertebrates, anticipation has a pervasive impact on even basic behaviors. In fish with no 
cerebral cortex, visually guided behavior is mediated by the tectum (which corresponds to the superior 
colliculus (SC) in birds and mammals (Mueller 2012)).  Whatever visual information processing is 
needed for collision avoidance, landmark navigation, or tracking is done in the tectum.  Although only 
a tenth of retinal output in mammals goes to the SC, ancient visually guided behaviors can be done in 
the SC (Mueller 2012).  However, mouse collision avoidance behavior is more sophisticated than the 
behavior of fish in terms of what they can anticipate.  Mice give wider berths to dangerous objects and 
to things capable of rapid acceleration.  These enhancements require specific information about 
particular objects that fish just don’t collect.  This discrimination between types of objects can only be 
done in the visual cortex and it requires a lot of retinal input and processing.. However, the structures 
composing the Where pathway (Mishkin and Ungerleider 1982, including V2 and V4, have reciprocal 
connections to the SC. Work with patients with damage to V1, i.e. only having input from SC into the 
cortical visual pathways can still perform basic visual tasks such as collision avoidance (Striemer, 
Chapman, and Goodale 2009).  
5 Complex Internal Models and Enhanced Survival Likelihood  
Animals as simple as snails can establish links between events through classical conditioning, and 
between objects with operant conditioning (Alexander et.al 1984).  Insects and other invertebrates can 
do landmark navigation to their nests and other places that require moving toward or away from 
landmarks that do not need to be recognizable as specific objects. Beyond these basic association 
mechanisms that have been extensively modeled in neural networks (McCelland, Rumelhardt 1986), 
humans have evolved four mechanisms for storing more complex relational information: 
• Familiar Space memory captures the functional groupings that must be in the same place 
in order to do a task. For example, saws, axes, wedges, and logs are a functional grouping 
associated with a place where firewood is prepared (Luria 1974). People can also 
recognize objects that don’t belong in a functional grouping; e g. a microwave does not 
belong with logs and a saw.  
• Internal maps of 2D and 3D structure, i.e. spatial memory (Allen 2004). Remembering a 
space in enough detail that you imagine walking thru it and can use it as a spatial 
mnemonic device is a very different level of spatial memory than the rudimentary spatial 
memory required for landmark navigation. 
• Episodic memory (Tulving 2001) captures not just what, where and when; but the causal 
sequences involved in the execution of a task, i.e. how things are used to carry out a task.  
This mechanism seems specific to humans and complex languages usage, as does the 
next mechanism. 
• Category hierarchies or ontologies. Saws, axes, screwdrivers and can openers are all 
tools, although they are unlikely to be used on the same task.   
Together these mechanisms form a tightly coupled and vast relational web.  It is impossible for 
people to pay attention to the whole vast relational web they have constructed over their life at once.  
A person’s sense of “current context” is tied to the active portion of their relational web.  The active 
portion of the relational web is in turn determined by the sensations or expectations that have drawn 
attention and act as starting points for activating specific geospatial, episodic, and functional grouping 
memories.  In this view, everything made active when attention is focused on a starting point is 
context information for the current situation.  Since attention can be focused on anything, everything is 
current context at some point and a starting point at others. Weather, terrain, and other operating 
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conditions are often drawn into the current context thru their many connections within the relational 
web. 
Relational information can be used to anticipate events of objects in a variety of ways.  Jui and 
Shah (2007) have shown that is possible to use the detection of known objects in a video sequence that 
belong to the same functional group as an activity to infer the presence of the activity even though the 
system has no perceptual evidence of the activity. Eilbert, et.al, (2002) used an analogous filling-in 
process to infer future situations based on the detection of part of a narrative sequence or plan. 
These results suggest that just recognizing parts of a functional grouping or an episodic-like 
memory would allow the cat to anticipate an associated event (without reasoning about exactly how it 
would occur), and respond emotionally to the event.   
5.1 Familiar Space Memory  
Because humans are able to perform data fusion with such flexibility and efficacy, it is reasonable 
to seek an automated data fusion model informed by these human capabilities.  However, They utilize 
all four of the relational memories discussed in the last section.  Not only do humans use these models 
to make detailed predictions, they are also able to create maps and narratives about actual and 
counterfactual situations by blending very different types of models. These capabilities allow humans 
to quickly interpret their current situation based on very incomplete sensory information that is 
contaminated with large amounts of noise and clutter.  This ability to robustly fuse information is far 
less potent, when a person is operating in an unfamiliar environment.   
Kaplan and Kaplan (1981) give the following description of how familiarity affects a person’s 
ability to act. “A person who is familiar with an environment acts as if the essentials of that 
environment were already stored in the head. Being familiar means being less dependent on the 
information from the environment. One need not pay as close attention, one need not be as sensitive to 
feedback because one knows [an essential object in that environment] is there, knows what to expect.  
Decisions can be made without waiting, without careful testing.”   
We can compare the experience of a person operating within a familiar space with Mica Endsley’s 
(2000) widely accepted theory of situation awareness (SA), described as “the perception of elements 
in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the 
projection of their status in the near future.”  Familiarity, if not encompassing the whole of SA, makes 
an essential contribution to its effective development.  
Humans can perform extensive manipulations of their Familiar Space models by combining 
existing Spaces in novel ways. They can form a new Familiar Space by blending attributes from two 
existing Familiar Spaces. They can also create Familiar Spaces that encompass vast regions of space 
or periods of time by compressing man “human Scale” Familiar Spaces into one by throwing out all 
but the most import objects or events.  Fauconnier (2002) uses the term Mental Spaces for Familiar 
Spaces that can be blended, compressed, and run.  Humans run a Mental Space by initializing the 
actors in the Mental Space and then “running” the behaviors of these simulated actors forward in time 
to generate expectations or backwards to create explanations within the particular constraints of the 
Mental Space.    
Humans are not the only animals to make use of familiarity in their environments, and there is 
evidence of “familiar space” capabilities in all animals that have evolved from reptiles (Galistel 1980, 
Eilbert 2009).  Human-level SA was not generated from scratch, but was built upon the abilities and 
internal models of the evolutionary predecessors of humans (Eilbert 2010).  Although lacking the 
narrative structure and flexibility of human Mental Spaces, less-evolved brains can still produce 
models that can be used to identify potential threats in a familiar space.  In other words, these animals 
have quite effective threat models, although not human-level models.  In the evolutionary process, old 
capabilities (such as landmark navigation) are enhanced as new mechanisms (such as the ability to 
group large numbers of simple features) evolve to support new capabilities (such as detailed object 
recognition).  Apparently supporting this process, new brain structures appear that have recurrent 
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connections to old brain structures.  This massive feedback and interconnection means that individual 
brain structures support multiple functions and that individual functions are distributed over multiple 
brain regions.  For this reason, it is very difficult to pinpoint the human brain functionality that 
supports a specific capability such as collision avoidance or threat recognition.  It is much easier to 
understand the way these capabilities function in simpler animals before they are enhanced by utilizing 
information from internal memories.   
5.2 Using Familiar Spaces to Enhance Survival Probabilities 
The basic processing cycle in which animals and humans use familiar space models is the Observe, 
Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop. Although even animals that are primarily reactive employ a basic 
OODA loop, animals that have multiple high-level contingent behaviors to choose from follow the 
inner OODA loop shown in Figure 1.  High-level behaviors, such as attack, defense, communication, 
logistics, and knowledge acquisition to enhance SA, will be prioritized based on an animal’s drives 
and goals.  Familiar space models are expanded and updated as the animal or human utilizing them 
switches from one high-level behavior to another.  
When the sensory inputs registered by an animal or human are not recognizable within the context 
of the familiar space model that is being used, the result is surprise.  Explicit expectations need not be 
violated in order to experience surprise.  Typically, the high level of uncertainty associated with 
surprise will break a user of familiar space models out of the inner OODA loop so that a response that 
mitigates this uncertainty can be produced.  These responses may include attempts to gather additional 
information about the uncertain situation as well as modifications to the familiar space models 
themselves.  The ways in which responses to uncertainty manifest depend on the sophistication of the 
familiar space capabilities of the animal in question. 
 
Figure 1: An Extended OODA Loop 
 
The most basic information-gathering behavior used as a response to uncertainty is simply 
remaining still and waiting for more information to come.  For more complex animals, behaviors that 
can actively reduce uncertainty, such as carefully approaching the source of the uncertainty, are also 
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possible.  The most sophisticated response of this type is for an animal to plan movements in order to 
collect the information they need to resolve uncertainty.  This requires the ability to imagine 
counterfactual situations in order to focus information-gathering efforts, something that can only be 
done by higher mammals (and perhaps tool using birds).  The process of using this type of exploration 
to reduce uncertainty is shown in the outer red loop of Figure 1. 
In addition to collecting more information from the external world to reduce uncertainty, 
sophisticated animals can also respond to surprise by updating or switching their own internal world 
models of a familiar space.  Creatures with the ability to focus on the specific portion of a familiar 
space that is violating their expectations, for instance, will respond by modifying their model based on 
the new information or switching to another model that more effectively describes the situation, as 
shown in the green loop in Figure 1.  These updated or newly selected models will then dictate a 
particular behavioral course of action.  When humans are faced with surprising observations, they are 
able to use their Mental Spaces to generate alternative explanations, combining multiple relevant 
models to produce a blend that describes the uncertain situation. 
6 Conclusions 
Any Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architecture (BICA) must be able satisfy to the Unity of 
Purpose criterion described by Alan Newell (1990) that has already been solved by vertebrates. 
According to Newell, “A single system (mind) produces all aspects of behavior. It is one mind that 
minds them all. Even if the mind has parts, modules, components, or whatever, they all mesh together 
to produce behavior. Any bit of behavior has causal tendrils that extend back through large parts of the 
total cognitive system before grounding in the environmental situation of some earlier times.” A 
second criterion solved by vertebrates and only aspired to by existing BICA is extended autonomy in a 
natural environment. 
It is proposes that the Vertebrate Strategy laid out in this paper is what forces increasingly complex 
vertebrates to continue to meet the unity of purpose and extended autonomy criteria.  In summary, the 
Vertebrate Strategy for building complex brains is to add structures around a core of midbrain 
structures that lie between sensory input and motor output.  According to recent work by Damasio and 
Panksepp/Biven this core can be broken up into seven distinct systems that each support different 
primitive emotions.  Each system releases distinct neurotransmitters that activate its own Emotional 
Action System.  In other words, several seconds after one Emotional Action System is activated the 
animal is very likely to engage in a high level, contingent behavior such as rage or mating that 
depends on the situation but has the same “flavor” each time it is activated.  The initial effect of 
activating these slow acting Emotional Action Systems is a set of bodily changes which are 
recognizable as emotions.  Cortical activity can inhibit (Panksepp and Bliven) or mediate primitive 
emotions, and make human emotion more difficult to read. 
Over evolutionary time, a sequence of structures has “popped” out of the core structures creating 
massive feedback loops among the sensory, motor, and core structures. The first feedback structure to 
pop out was the cerebellum, and the newest the cerebral cortex.  The new structures enhance, rather 
than eliminate, old useful behaviors, and occasionally generate new behaviors.  While better motor 
capability paid the cost for higher complexity when the cerebellum was added to the vertebrate core, 
the cost of complexity for later additions was paid by better prediction and filling-in of missing 
information.   
The central role of Seeking System in prediction was discussed, and how the evolution of 
improved Familiar Space memory serves as the driver for making more specific and accurate 
predictions.   
Figure 1 suggests an approach to building a BICA consistent with the Vertebrate Strategy.  The 
Seeking System would control the outer loop of the Extended OODA Loop and deal with various 
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types of uncertainty.  It would use prediction to resolve sensory uncertainty, as well as deciding 
among predictions about which Emotional Action system could deliver the greatest reward or avoid 
the worst problem. The rest of the Emotional Action systems would control the middle layer of the 
OODA loop.  The winner of the competition among Emotional Action systems would get to determine 
which behaviors are available, which relational memories are accessible, and the operating 
characteristics of the sensory systems. The switching would be driven by predictive error, behavior 
completion, and surprise. The inner loop would make situation estimations, and action selections 
under the constraints of the Emotional Action systems in the outer loops. 
Further work on the vertebrate strategy would involve building a computational implementation of 
the computational OODA loop.  The key to the success of this endeavor would be a robust 
implementation of the Seeking system, which would need to create a unity of purpose for the whole 
system.  The most appropriate test of such a vertebrate strategy BICA would involve demonstrating 
long-term autonomy in a natural environment. 
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